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Abstract: Lucas (1972) was a paper that permanently changed the course of 
macroeconomics, even though its “money supply surprise” model lost its central place in 
the area within a decade because of empirical difficulties. However, Lucas’s novel 
methodology, based on clearing markets and rational expectations, still dominates 
orthodox macroeconomic theorising. An unfortunate side effect of this has been that, 
because mainstream models have no analytic room for money to play a key role in 
economic activity, the theoretical case for taking that role seriously was undermined just 
at the time when traditional monetarist macro-models were facing empirical problems. 
The consequences of all this for today’s monetary policy environment are briefly 
discussed. 
Key words: Lucas, neutral money, monetarism, Keynesianism, micro-foundations, clearing-
markets, inflation, recession. 
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“Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” was hardly a new topic in 1972. 
Economists had been debating these matters for about two and a half centuries 
even before Maynard Keynes (1936) declared that “a monetary economy … is 
essentially one in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing 
the quantity of employment and not merely its direction” (Keynes 1936, p. xii). 
But Robert Lucas’s view of this time-honoured subject was nevertheless original 
and important. When an economist meets a set of economic ideas, it is usually the 
economist whose subsequent biography is influenced. This was one of those rare 
encounters that permanently changed the evolution of the ideas as well. The 
capacity of Lucas’s analysis to do this was quickly recognised, if not in all 
quarters. For example, though “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” was 
rejected by the American Economic Review, Neil Wallace and Thomas Sargent had 
read it in working paper form well before its eventual publication, and, as its 
significance sank in, had begun a radical readjustment of their own research by 
1973.1     
Lucas (1972) set in motion a new episode in economic thought which, after a 
further fifty years, has left us with the macroeconomic theory which academic 
economists now teach, and the practices which policy makers now implement. 
Lucas is not to be held directly responsible for all of these consequences, and the 
evidence suggests that at least one of them, namely the current marginalisation of 
money itself in the theory and conduct of monetary policy, was not what he 
intended. But, without his 1972 paper, macroeconomics would be very different in 
2022. 
 
Macroeconomics in Disarray   
In 1972, still-dominant “Keynesian” ideas about theory and policy were under 
extreme pressure on many fronts, though it was unclear whether, let alone how, the 
several debates then in progress related to one another. Macroeconomics was “in 
 
1 See Douglas Clement (2013) and Sargent (1996). Note, however, that Sargent recounts that it was 
reading a draft of what became Lucas (1976) in 1973 that finally alerted him fully to the importance of 




disarray,” to borrow a phrase that Karl Brunner (1989) would apply to a later 
episode also to be discussed in these notes. Immediately prior to 1972, three major 
themes were of particular importance: 
First of all, Keynes (1936) had sought to explain the chronic unemployment of the 
inter-war years, but, once World War 2 and its immediate aftermath were over, 
high though fluctuating employment and inflation became the salient features of 
market economies everywhere. In response, from the late ‘50s onwards, the 
exponents of what was by then mainstream macroeconomics, following Bill 
Phillips (1956) and Richard Lipsey (1960), incorporated the “Phillips relationship” 
between inflation and unemployment, into their thinking, and then added a variable 
measuring agents’ expectations of the inflation rate to the right hand side of the 
equation describing it, though at first not always with the unit coefficient that the 
theoretical work of Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968)  implied. 
This step, along with a then still hesitant revival of interest in the Fisher (1896) 
effect of expected inflation on nominal interest rates gave new impetus to a search 
for ways of giving substantive content to this variable. The error learning 
hypothesis had provided a popular fix here since the 1950s, but no-one was 
satisfied with it and a small scale industry had developed that was trying to 
improve on it in all manner of often ad-hoc ways.2 
Second, on the theoretical front, it had been noticed, again even in the 1950s, that 
the two halves of the representative economic theory syllabus, usually labelled 
“macroeconomics,” and “microeconomics,” bore little if any discernable analytic 
relationship to one another. By 1972, a hunt for the so-called “micro-foundations 
of macroeconomics” had long been in full cry, in a complicated literature whose 
contributors shared a common belief that, wherever these might be found, it would 
not be in the Walrasian general equilibrium theory in which markets always 
cleared that figured so prominently in the microeconomic part of the syllabus.3 
Third, and last but not least, by the early 1970s, the “Monetarist counter-
revolution” against Keynesian ideas had become a major feature of 
macroeconomic debates, particularly on the policy front. Monetarist doctrine had 
 
2 See David Laidler and Michael Parkin (1975, pp.197-202), for an account of these efforts. 
3 See, e.g., Don Patinkin (1956), Robert Clower (1965, 1967) Axel Leijonhufvud (1968), and Robert 




been developing haphazardly since the 1950s, under diverse leadership.4 But from 
the outset it had centered around a clear central message: namely that, because the 
demand for money function was, as a matter of empirical fact, both less interest 
elastic and more stable over time than Keynes had claimed in 1936, “money 
mattered” much more for the behaviour of the economy, and hence for economic 
policy, than his followers were willing to allow. More specifically, inflation 
everywhere was rising significantly by 1972 and presenting policy problems too 
serious to be ignored, and Friedman’s (1970) still famous corollary to 
monetarism’s basic theoretical propositions namely that “Inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” was generating heated controversy both 
within and beyond academia. 
   
A New Orderliness 
In short, in 1972, as in 1936, debates about macroeconomic issues were intense but 
fragmented.  In just nineteen remarkable pages - compare this to the General 
Theory’s 403 - Lucas’s “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” set out an 
apparently comprehensive blueprint for the restoration of intellectual order to the 
whole sub-discipline. Lucas offered his readers (or at least those who could follow 
his difficult mathematics and explain its meaning to their colleagues): first, a 
procedure for modelling expectations as the “rational” predictions of forward-
looking maximising agents who understood the properties of the economy in which 
they operated, and applied this knowledge to their formation; second, an end to the 
search for new micro-foundations for macroeconomics by showing that 
fluctuations in output and employment were after all compatible with the 
Walrasian general equilibrium model in which markets always cleared; and hence, 
third, a theoretically rigorous reconciliation of a monetary explanation of inflation 
with the simultaneous occurrence of those puzzling variations in real variables that 
formed the empirical basis of Keynesian skepticism about it. 
More specifically, Lucas showed that real fluctuations could occur if agents lacked 
information about the current value of the general price level - an appealingly 
realistic proposition - and thus had to base their decisions about real variables on 
 




estimates of the structure of relative prices inferred from price information 
obtained in local markets. In so doing, they would use their understanding of the 
economy’s structure, as well as prior knowledge about the behaviour of the money 
supply, and hence the price level, over time, not least about the time series 
properties of disturbances to that behaviour. Real fluctuations would then be 
generated when variations in the rate of monetary expansion came as a surprise, 
and negative surprises in particular would cause real contractions even in the 
presence of ongoing inflation. In the absence of surprises, however, money would 
be neutral and prices would move in real-output-change-adjusted proportion to the 
quantity of money. It is hardly surprising that, Lucas (1972) was widely and 
immediately interpreted as providing, among other things, a ringing theoretical 
endorsement of the basic empirical tenets of the Monetarist counter-revolution. 
 
The new Classical Agenda  
For those who, like for example Sargent and Wallace, understood and accepted this 
powerful and unifying resolution of then-current macroeconomic debates, it also 
provided a new analytic basis for the future development of the whole sub-
discipline. Implications for, among other topics, the interpretation of then 
ubiquitous macro-econometric models and the significance and appropriate 
conduct of monetary policy were quickly made explicit and, by the late 1970s, 
what was by then called “new Classical” economics seemed (to its adherents at 
least) capable of dealing with all the traditional problems that the macroeconomics 
that preceded it had faced.5  This property was particularly appealing to new-
comers to the discipline who were seemingly relieved of the need to read anything 
published before 1972, at least in macroeconomics. Any missing details of this 
reconstructed sub-discipline could, furthermore, be filled in by the systematic 
application to any issue of the analytic principles that new Classical economics 
embodied, another feature well calculated to appeal to those same new-comers as 
they looked for research topics.  
The above-mentioned analytic principles required that the economy’s 
“fundamentals” – endowments, tastes, technology and the rules of the game (i.e., 
 




forward looking maximising behaviour informed by rational expectations in 
continuously clearing markets) – be explicitly described, that the nature of shocks 
to it be precisely specified, and that all results be then rigorously derived from this 
information, with no extraneous ad-hoc additions – e.g., “free parameters” whose 
values were left to the data to determine – being allowed to intrude along the way.6 
Any work that did not follow this blueprint was at least suspect, and to purists 
among Lucas’s followers, not even worth discussion. As is usually the case with 
such movements, Lucas, the founder of the new Classical school, was more 
tolerant of dissent. 
But refusals by many of its adherents to engage with those who disagreed with 
them did not exempt new Classical economics from criticism, its unifying potential 
for macroeconomics notwithstanding, and by the mid-‘80s Brunner (1989, but 
delivered as a lecture 1986) would accurately characterise the sub-discipline as 
having once more fallen into “disarray.” This state of affairs came about because, 
although the new Classical economics of the 1970s failed abjectly in its encounters 
with empirical experience, it simultaneously succeeding triumphantly in its efforts 
to impose new professional standards of deductive rigour on the formulation of 
theory.  
The methodology of positive economics (in all of its many variations), so 
influential before 1972, required (and still does) that, when an existing theory 
encounters empirical problems, modifications to it should be conjectured and then 
put to further test. After 1972, the insistence of new Classical economics on sound 
micro-foundations limited admissible conjectures to those that could be 
demonstrably deduced from “fundamentals.”  If they did not meet this standard, 
their compatibility (or lack thereof) with empirical evidence was deemed 
irrelevant, and, lacking a satisfactory theoretical explanation, so was the relevance 
of the evidence that had created the problem in the first place.7 The fact that these 
 
6 I base this succinct characterization of new Classical methods on my personal recollection of a 1987 oral 
presentation by Tom Sargent at a Siena conference aimed primarily at advanced graduate students. It does 
not appear in the finally published form of the paper he presented (Albert Marcet and Sargent, 1992). 





methodological views were of extremely questionable philosophical validity did 
not prevent their widespread acceptance.8 
 
Early Criticisms of new Classical Economics 
A number of specific criticisms would quickly be levelled at new Classical 
economics after 1972, with the earliest of these focussing on its most obviously 
novel component, namely the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). As Lucas 
had formulated it, this treated information as either freely available to agents or not 
at all. Thus its structure ruled out what Edgar Feige and Douglas Pearce (1976) 
called “economically rational expectations,” the idea that the production and 
processing of information might come with a rising marginal cost, and that the 
behaviour of even rational maximizers might be therefore be based on less than all 
available information about the situations facing them.  
Not least, some argued that under such conditions agents might hold precautionary 
money balances to cushion themselves against errors to which they would not be 
exposed if the acquisition of market information were cheaper, and, for the price 
setters among them, the costs of trading at “wrong” prices less punitive.9 That such 
considerations might be empirically important was in due course decisively 
confirmed by the finding of John Boschen and Grossman (1982). They showed that 
readily observable current variations in US money growth were systematically 
related to subsequent variations in real variables, rather than in only the price level, 
as they would have been had agents been systematically monitoring them and 
basing pricing decisions on this information. And they also showed that variations 
in money growth that were not public knowledge, as represented by initial 
measurement errors in the published data whose subsequent correction provided a 
direct empirical measure of monetary  “surprises,” had no discernable effect on 
anything. 
It took only a little longer for the empirical problems posed by Lucas’s treatment 
of the expectations augmented Phillips curve to attract attention. It was, in fact, 
already obvious from models that had deployed a market-clearing approach even 
 
8 See, e.g., Kevin Hoover (1984) and Brunner (1989). 




before 1972, including Lucas and Leonard Rapping (1970), that this assumption 
implied that causation ran from prices (or money wages) to output (or 
employment) along the curve, rather than in the opposite direction as had been 
postulated by Phillips (1956).  But, it does not seem to have been until the mid-
1970s that it was also noticed that this formulation was in conflict with one of the 
best established stylised facts about the dynamic interactions of money with real 
and nominal variables: namely, that, when money growth changes, changes in real 
variables systematically precede those in the inflation rate. Attempts to deal with 
this inconsistency would thereafter lead to some remarkable intellectual tangles 
whose details are too complicated to explain here.10 
This empirical problem was closely linked to another one whose significance had 
been clear, not least to Lucas himself, from the outset: namely that of explaining 
the persistence over time of deviations of output and employment from their 
“natural” values after a monetary surprise. The rational expectations hypothesis as 
formulated in (1972) eliminated the distributed lags implicit in the error learning 
hypothesis that it had superseded and upon which earlier monetarist models had 
relied to generate such persistence.11 But Lucas’s own (1973) empirical work 
initially replaced these with equally arbitrary adjustment lags in the dynamics of 
output deviations, and hence violated his own methodological ban on resort to 
“free parameters” to reconcile theory with evidence. Nor did his second and much 
more systematic effort (Lucas 1975) to address this problem by postulating a more 
complex and drawn out mechanism describing the dissemination of information 
fare any better in the face of the observation that the existence of economy wide 
asset markets would short-circuit such effects.12  
And there was a further, even more fundamental problem that went to the very 
heart of Lucas’s desire, so obvious from his paper’s title, to vindicate a tradition in 
the theory of money that dated back (at least) to David Hume (1752), while 
simultaneously maintaining the market-clearing postulate: namely, that even in the 
 
10 See, e.g., Barro’s (1978) efforts to fit a macro-econometric model embodying new Classical principles 
with U.S. data. 
11 See, e.g., Laidler (1973) and Laidler and Parkin (1975). 
12  See Lucas (1975) and Edi Karni (1980). As Pierrick Clerc and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira (2021) 
show, recent efforts to revive interest in dispersed information as the source of economy-wide real 




1960s, it had been understood that the very nature of market clearing models was 
incompatible with the institution of monetary exchange.13  
An asset resembling “money,” could, of course, be formally introduced into such a 
system. Lucas did so in (1972) using the overlapping-generations approach that 
treated this asset as a pure store of value, and hence ignored money’s role in the 
mechanism of exchange. This latter weakness is perhaps why, when he tried again 
in (1984), Lucas instead borrowed Clower’s (1967) cash in advance constraint, 
which made money a means of exchange and nothing else, from the very “micro-
foundations” literature that new Classical economics had allegedly rendered 
redundant. However, this latter procedure violated the requirement that all 
components of an economic model be deducible from fundamentals, and was in 
any event, unable to match an already massive body of evidence about the 
properties of real world demand for money functions. Buffer-stock models of the 
demand for money, based on the notion mentioned earlier that information came at 
a positive marginal cost, and its corollary that agents’ market decisions were based 
on less than “all available” information seemed for a while to fare much better with 
the data, but were routinely dismissed as irrelevant because they violated new 
classical standards of deductive rigour, and they faded from the literature as the 
1980s progressed.14   
 
Monetary Policy at the Turn of the Decade 
Meanwhile, during the 1970s, the political acceptability of anti-inflation policies 
based on the control of money growth had been much enhanced, not only by the 
growing seriousness of the actual inflationary situation in the wake of the failure of 
Keynesian alternatives, but also by the rapid acceptance of new Classical ideas by 
many of their academic advocates. The apparent predictions of the rational 
expectations hypothesis about the likely low costs of monetary contraction 
provided that it was preannounced, certainly played a role here, though how 
significant this was is open to debate.  
 
13 See, e.g., Frank Hahn (1965). 




Be that as it may, in the late 1970s, quasi-monetarist policies that focused on the 
control of money growth were widely and conspicuously applied, with mixed 
results. Where money growth fell so gradually as to be virtually invisible, nothing 
much happened (e.g., Canada before 1981); where it was reduced systematically 
and visibly, but with moderation, inflation stabilised and began to fall (e.g., 
Switzerland and West Germany); and where contraction was first delayed, and 
then sharply and suddenly applied (e.g., the U.S., the U.K, and Canada after 1981) 
inflation fell rapidly, but its fall was accompanied by real contractions on a scale 
unprecedented in post-war experience. These were far more severe than monetarist 
analysis, particularly when influenced by the rational expectations hypothesis, had 
led anyone to believe.  
The main lesson of this episode for the application of this hypothesis to policy 
analysis was quickly absorbed: namely, that it is not sufficient simply to announce 
a new monetary policy; rather if it is to proceed smoothly with little real disruption, 
that announcement must also be credible. Observed relationships between changes 
in money growth and the subsequent behaviour of output and prices during this 
episode were nevertheless in qualitative accord with the predictions of traditional 
monetarism. But a profession that had become widely accustomed to thinking of 
new Classical economics as simply a more rigorous mark 2 version of this old 
doctrine, carelessly misinterpreted the contractions of the early 1980s as 
discrediting its mark 1 version as well.15 
Thus, although this episode, may well have been, as Brunner (1983) would vainly 
protest, traditional monetarism’s “failure that wasn’t and . . . success that was,” it 
was, along with Friedman’s (1984) widely publicised and erroneous prediction of 
the imminent reappearance of double digit inflation in its wake, interpreted as 
undermining the empirical case for basing monetary policy on control of the 
money supply. The theoretical case for this practice meanwhile continued its 
already-begun journey into limbo as influential new Classical economists failed to 
generate an empirically useful theory of money, but simultaneously remained 
 
15 The Monetarism mark 1 and 2 labels are James Tobin’s (1981), and as far as I am aware, Lucas, 




unwilling to countenance other approaches to the issue that violated their 
methodological standards.16  
 
Macroeconomics in Disarray Again 
So, by the early ‘80s, the empirical and policy failure of Lucas’s macroeconomic 
revolution, working in conjunction with its success in establishing a new 
theoretical methodology for the sub-discipline, had also put a stop to Friedman’s 
monetarist counter-revolution. Though some hoped for a Keynesian Recovery in 
macroeconomic analysis on the lines pioneered by Leijonhufvud (1968) to ensue, 
this approach remained a minority taste, leaving mainstream macroeconomics to 
develop along two other principal lines.17  
One was so-called “new-Keynesian” macroeconomics, which got its start with 
Stanley Fischer (1977) and Phelps and John Taylor (1977). This approach, whose 
relationship to Keynes (1936) was tenuous, re-established the phenomenon of price 
stickiness as a respectable component of macro-economic models, first by way of 
recognising the existence of labour market contracts, but later, and perhaps less 
arbitrarily, by way of the replacement of perfectly with imperfectly competitive 
markets as a fundamental structural assumption.  The other was real business cycle 
theory, pioneered by Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1982). This maintained 
the new-Classical market clearing axiom, but attributed the occurrence of real 
economic fluctuations to unspecified shocks not to the behaviour of money, or any 
other demand side variable, but to a non-existent relationship, the aggregate 
 
16 Search theoretic models, e.g., Robert Jones (1976) and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randoph Wright (1989), 
were too abstract to meet this test. See Laidler (1988) for a discussion. For an example of the new 
Classicals’ refusal to acknowledge work on money that did not meet their theoretical standards, see 
Wallace’s (1990) refusal to engage as a discussant with the empirical substance of James Lothian, 
Michael Darby and Michael Tindall’s (1990) paper on buffer stock models of the demand for money.  
17 The above italicised and optimistic phrase is borrowed from the title of Peter Howitt (1990), an 
undeservedly neglected collection of essays written between 1974 and 1988, that significantly extend the 




production function, and explained their persistence by the fact that capital 
equipment takes “time to build.”18  
What these otherwise incompatible approaches had in common was an 
unshakeable belief in the irrelevance of money, neutral or not, for any interesting 
empirical question that might have some relevance to economic policy. For new 
Keynesians such as Michael Woodford (2003) this stance derived its authority first 
of all from the beliefs of old Keynesians such as Tobin (1981) and Benjamin 
Friedman (2003), who had never been convinced by the monetarist attacks of the 
‘60s and ‘70s, but was considerably re-enforced by their adoption of new Classical 
modelling techniques in formal analysis that left no room for money to play an 
essential role in the stories they developed. For real business cycle modellers, it 
followed inevitably from their self-conscious insistence, directly inherited from 
Lucas, on clearing markets as the basis for all acceptable analysis.  
Real business cycle theory could, of course, find room if need be, and soon did, for 
the arbitrary introduction of  “outside” money to determine the price level, in a nod 
to formal completeness, and also for “inside money” to respond passively to real 
fluctuations, much as it did in new (or even post) Keynesian systems.19 But nothing 
of further interest followed from this fact. Lucas, who would subsequently make 
the neutrality of money the central topic of his 1995 Nobel Prize Lecture and 
would be the author of at least four empirical papers in which the demand for 
money function figures prominently, could hardly have been happy with this 
outcome.20 
 
The Emergence of Inflation Targeting 
If macroeconomics was indeed in disarray by the mid-1980s, monetary policy still 
had to be conducted. Central banks searched for ways of keeping inflation is single 
 
18  Difficulties with the concept of an aggregate production function have been known to exist since the 
third (1821) edition of David Ricardo’s Principles, and figure prominently in modern heterodox work that 
follows the lead of Piero Sraffa (1960). But, for terse statement of them in the neoclassical tradition, see 
Franklin Fisher (2005). 
19 See Robert King and Charles Plosser (1983). 
20 See Lucas (1988), Lucas (2000), Lucas and Nicolini (2015), Luca Benati, Lucas, Juan Pablo Nicolini 




digits and perhaps reducing it further. In a few cases, notably West Germany and 
Switzerland, where the local quasi-monetarist regimes adopted in the 1970s had 
not collapsed, these continued to evolve until the creation of the Euro decisively 
changed the landscape. But elsewhere, not least in jurisdictions where quasi-
monetarist regimes had, fairly or not, been judged outright failures, ad hoc drift 
became the order of the day, until, in the early ‘90s, policy makers, led by those in 
New Zealand, Canada and the UK, stumbled on inflation targeting. This approach 
was adopted by its pioneers for many and various local reasons, as much political 
as economic, none of which had much to do with then current (or even obsolete) 
academic ideas about the nature of the monetary economy.21 The resulting regimes 
were widely emulated elsewhere as the decade progressed.  
Even so, the seamless interweaving of a credible policy goal that anchored 
inflation expectations with a formal macroeconomic model which came to 
characterise those regimes by the turn of the millennium did not already exist as an 
available framework for the theory and practice of policy in the early 1990s; it was 
the product of subsequent learning by doing.22  Even the credibility that began to 
characterise inflation targets in some jurisdictions during that decade had not been 
confidently predicted on the basis of the rational expectations hypothesis when 
they were first introduced. It too was the product of experience as central banks, to 
their own surprise one suspects, actually succeeded in hitting their targets with 
noticeable frequency during the “the Great Moderation” that followed their 
adoption.23 
But, the fact that inflation was low and fluctuations in it were small under inflation 
targeting, had another effect: namely, it left essentially nothing for variations in 
money growth to explain.24 To adopt vocabulary taken over by the ECB from the 
Bundesbank, by the end of the ‘90s, it seemed to most observers that monetary 
policy was adequately supported by its “economic pillar” alone, rendering its 
“monetary pillar” redundant and hence disposable. So, central banks everywhere 
 
21 On New Zealand and the UK, see Charles Goodhart (2010), and on Canada see Charles Freedman 
(2010) and Laidler (2020). 
22 The model, which forms the basic template for Woodford (2003), consisted of an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve, a function relating output to the deviation of the real interest rate from its 
“normal” level, and a Taylor rule to determine the policy setting of the nominal rate. 
23 For a detailed account of these developments in the Canadian case, see Laidler (2020). 




did indeed dispose of it. Thus, though inflation targeting is sometimes referred to 
as “monetarism without money,” because, partially echoing Friedman (1970), it 
treats the medium term behaviour of the price level as the only goal of monetary 
policy, and delegates shorter-term stabilisation issues (if needed) to other policy 
tools, its adoption owed nothing to the rational expectations hypothesis, and its 
conduct came to ignore money entirely, neutral or otherwise. It is hard to claim, 
therefore, that it owed anything to Lucas (1972). 
 
The Crisis of 2007-9 
The financial crisis of 2007-9 put a violent end to the great moderation. It proved 
to be a notable example of that “residue of things” (Lucas 2004) which the by-
then-dominant stochastic dynamic general equilibrium analysis that had its origins 
in Lucas (1972), hadn’t been letting its exponents think about for more than a 
quarter century. Except among heterodox Austrians and post-Keynesians, and a 
very few others, such as Claudio Borio and William White (2004), who 
remembered that US experience in the late ‘20s had shown that the maintenance of 
price stability is not sufficient to ward off financial and real instability, reaction to 
this crisis was therefore characterised by extreme shock, followed by much 
intellectual muddle.  
Fortunately, however, the Fed’s rapid appreciation of the contemporary relevance 
of US experience during the Great Contraction of the early 1930s prevented a 
repeat of this earlier catastrophe. That institution led the world’s policy makers in 
doing whatever was necessary to save the international economy, financial and 
real, from complete collapse. But the immediate inspiration here came not from 
any revival of monetarist ideas about the role played by money in the earlier 
episode. Rather it came from Chairman Ben Bernanke’s (1983) work on the 
importance of credit market failures in that story.  
Any chance of a serious revival of interest in monetarist ideas as events unfolded 
was, furthermore, nipped in the bud by warnings of imminent inflation, as strident 




most distinguished surviving exponents.25 These commentators had apparently 
failed to notice that the policy induced explosion in the size of the Fed’s balance 
sheet after 2008 was not leading to a corresponding expansion of the quantity of 
money, a phenomenon associated with the payment of interest on newly created 
reserves during this episode, but which had also marked the experience of the mid-
1930s. They thus set monetarism up for what was once more perceived to be major 
empirical failure, every bit as dramatic, though every bit as fictitious, as that of the 
early 1980s. 
 
Complicating Inflation Targeting  
If the crisis of 2007-9 thus pushed money even further to the margins of serious 
macroeconomic discourse, it also undermined the simplicity of inflation targeting 
as it had been practiced until then. Financial markets had ceased to function in 
some jurisdictions, and for a while, the trajectories of prices and output had 
threatened to mimic those of 1930. And even where the impact of the crisis was 
less dramatic, simply to cut short interest rates as low as was institutionally 
feasible, and then await the recovery of the inflation rate, had been immediately 
and universally recognised as an absurdly inadequate policy response. 
Thus, by simple force of economic and political circumstances, output and 
employment began to rejoin the inflation rate as policy targets during what came to 
be called “the great recession” and fiscal policy re-emerged as an important 
companion to monetary measures. In the monetary field specifically, all manner of 
policy instruments were also rushed into place to supplement the overnight interest 
rate, and two of these are of particular interest here: quantitative easing (QE), and 
forward guidance (FG). Not only did they play significant roles immediately after 
2008 but, resurrected in the wake of the economic crisis brought on by the Covid 
pandemic that began in 2020, they now dominate the monetary policy landscape. 
QE is a new name for an old measure, Open Market Operations, which were 
strongly recommended to an unfortunately reluctant Fed in the early 1930s by, 
among many others, Keynes (1931), and also, albeit in retrospect, by Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz (1963).  The latter emphasised the beneficial influence that open 
 




market operations might have had on money growth in the early ‘30s, but  present-
day exponents of QE ignore this channel, stressing instead its capacity to lower 
long term interest rates. Not coincidentally, this was Keynes’s (1931) view of the 
matter which, transmitted by Bernanke’s work on the Depression, was readily 
absorbed by new Keynesian economics. Today’s QE is hardly a legacy of 
Monetarism, then, and, to return to the topic of these notes, it owes nothing to 
Lucas (1972) either. 
The intellectual antecedents of FG are more difficult to identify. The aim of 
today’s central banks, when they are precise and explicit in communicating their 
future policy intentions, is to influence the public’s expectations and hence amplify 
their responses to current measures. It would be foolhardy to deny the possibility 
that such measures reflect a lasting influence of Sargent and Wallace’s original 
deployment of Lucas’s rational expectations hypothesis in the analysis of monetary 
policy, supplemented by later evidence on the vital importance of clarity and 
credibility in the communication of policy intentions. And it is also hard to deny 
that the now famous phrase “Whatever it takes” worked exactly as intended. 
But the passage from The General Theory quoted above (para. 1) is hardly unique 
in Keynes’s writings in stressing the importance of expectations in economic life: 
the Treatise on Money (1930, ii, 352-367), an example particularly relevant in the 
current context, contains a lengthy discussion of the importance of the behaviour of 
the short rate of interest, including expectations engendered by it, for that of long 
rates and hence for investment spending. And discussions of “announcement 
effects” were commonplace in the monetary policy debates of the 1960s, not least 
among central bankers. The following quotation is drawn from the Bank of 
England’s contribution to a 1969 conference: “The role of expectations is . . .  
much greater than is normally assumed in academic and journalistic comment. 
Changes in the climate of expectations brought about by events . . .or by the timing 
and manner of the announcement and implementation of policy measures – can 
often act to negate or greatly reinforce the tactics of the authorities” (Bank of 
England (1970),  p. 228).  
Perhaps, then, we need to suspend judgement on how much importance should be 




Hypothesis into macroeconomics for the development of today’s ideas about FG, 
pending a little more systematic historical research on the matter. 
 
The Current Macro-policy Situation 
So, ironically, the characteristic of today’s monetary policy scene on which the 
influence of Lucas (1972) is most definitely apparent seems to be the almost total 
absence of attention currently being paid to the behaviour of money in discussions, 
let alone in the actual conduct, of policy.26 As already noted, this is probably not an 
outcome that Lucas intended, but it was logically implicit in the analytic principles 
he propounded, and it is extremely important at the current policy juncture for 
several reasons.   
First, by adopting in late 2020 “no-change until late 2022 or mid 2023” FG for 
their then rock bottom policy interest rates, inflation targeting central banks in 
effect declared that monetary policy henceforth had two explicit and well 
publicised targets. The inflation rate remained policy’s ultimate goal but was 
joined by a target for its basic instrument, the overnight rate.  Second, and 
crucially, though QE may not have been intended to promote money growth when 
it was introduced on a large scale in 2020, it did, with a vengeance. The money 
supply veritably exploded in some jurisdictions for a while in 2020 and (at the time 
of writing) is still expanding at rates that are high by the standards of the last three 
decades. And finally, it now looks possible that, as a result, monetary policy’s two 
targets are proving to be incompatible. If this is really so, central banks will be 
forced to raise interest rates ahead of schedule in the face of persistently above-
target inflation rates, and their credibility with the public, not to mention their 
political masters, will be badly damaged, perhaps to the extent of making an 
orderly restoration of any regime based on an independently pursued medium term 
goal for inflation in the next few years extremely problematic. 
On the other hand, the current (again at the time of writing) mainstream consensus 
that money does not matter may turn out to be correct after all. The current 
 
26 The italicised qualification is significant:  dissenting commentators are few, but Michael Belongia and 
Peter Ireland, Tim Congdon, Steve Hanke, Robert Hetzel, and Scott Sumner continue to stress the 




inflation might still prove to be transitory and fade away of its own accord as 
central banks are predicting. If these things happen, then all will be well with the 
theory and practice of monetary policy that has dominated the last three decades.27 
But if they don’t, if the most basic monetarist proposition about the behaviour of 
the price level, that was adopted unquestioningly in Lucas (1972), (despite its 
incompatibility with his analytic approach): namely, that it is determined by the 
interaction of the supply and demand for money, and its corollary that in the long 
run inflation responds systematically to variations in money growth, are still true, 
then there is serious economic and political trouble ahead. Macroeconomics thus 
seems to be in the middle of an important natural experiment. 
 
The Significance of Lucas (1972) Today 
To sum up, then: it seems that the influence of “Expectations and the Neutrality of 
Money” began to wane forty years ago, and that its only remaining visible effect 
has been one that its author did not intend, namely to undermine the theoretical 
element in the case for according  money a central role macroeconomic analysis. 
But if there were no more to matters than this, we would not now be celebrating 
the fiftieth anniversary of its publication.  To understand why it seems natural to do 
so, we need to adopt the viewpoint not of current practitioners of macroeconomics 
seeking help from Lucas in dealing with current problems of theory and policy, but 
of historians of the field, seeking to understand what role his work has played both 
in creating them and forming the ideas we bring to them.  
As I hope is apparent from the preceding pages, it is my personal view that the 
publication of that paper half a century ago marked a decisive turning point in the 
trajectory of thinking about the macro-economy and hence, as a consequence, in its 
actual behaviour as well.  Had Lucas (1972) not been written and read, the 
intellectual landscape, not to mention the external economic environment, we 
currently inhabit would be very different. Whether this has been for the better or 
the worse would require speculation on what the alternatives might have looked 
like, and that is a task best left to other authors who were less involved than this 
one in the debates of the last fifty years. 
 





Bank of England (in consultation with the Treasury) (1970) The operation of monetary policy 
since Radcliffe in, H. G. Johnson and D. R, Croome (eds.)  Money in Britain,Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 
Barro, R. J. (1978) Unanticipated money, output and the price level in the United States, Journal 
of Political Economy 86 549-581 
-------------  (1979) Second thoughts on Keynesian economics, American Economic Review 69 
54-59 
------------- and H. Grossman (1976) Money, Employment and Inflation, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
Benati, L, R.E. Lucas Jr., J. P. Nicolini and W. Weber (2016) International        evidence on the 
long run demand for money www.nber.org/papers/w22475 
Bernanke, B. (1983) Non-monetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the Great 
Depression, American Economic Review 73 257-276  
Borio, C. and W. White (2004) Whither monetary and financial stability? the implications of 
evolving policy regimes, BIS Working Paper 147 
Boschen, J. and H. Grossman (1982) Tests of equilibrium macroeconomics using 
contemporaneous data, Journal of Monetary Economics 10, 309-333 
Brunner, K.(1970) The monetarist revolution in monetary theory, Weltwirschaftliches Archiv 
105, 1-30 
-------------  (1971) A survey of selected issues in monetary theory Schweizeriche Zeitschrift fuer 
Volkwirtchaft und Statistik (March) 1-146 
-------------  (1983) Has monetarism failed? Cato Journal 3, 23-62 
-------------  (1989) The disarray in macroeconomics, in F. Capie and G. E. Wood (eds.) 
MonetaryEconomics in the 1980s London, Macmillan 
Clement D. (2013) Interview with Neil Wallace, 
www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2013/interview-with-neil-wallace 
Clerc, P., and R. Dos Santos Ferreira (2021) Dispersed information and the non-neutrality of 




Clower, R. W. (1965) The Keynesian counter-revolution – a theoretical appraisal, in F. H. Hahn 
and F. W. Brechling (eds.) The Theory of Interest Rates, London, Macmillan, for the 
International Economics Association 
----------------  (1967) A reconsideration of the microfoundations of monetary theory, Western 
Economic Journal 6, 1-8 
Feige, E. and Pearce D. (1976) Economically rational expectations: are innovations in the rate of 
inflation independent of innovations in monetary anf fiscal policy Journal of Political Economy 
84, 499-522 
Fischer S. (1977) Long-term contracts, rational expectations and the optimal money supply rule, 
Journal of Political Economy 85 191-206 
Fisher, F. (2005) Aggregate production functions - a pervasive but unpersuasive fairy story 
Eastern Economic Journal 31 489-491 
Fisher I. (1896) Appreciation and Interest, AEA Publications 3 (11) 331-442 
Freedman C. (2010) From monetary targeting to inflation targeting: the change in the role of 
money in the conduct of monetary policy, in R. Leeson (ed) David Laidler’s Contributions to 
Economics, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Friedman, B. (2003) The LM curve: a not so fond farewell, in Bank of Canada, 
Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, a Festschrift in honour of Charles 
Freedman Ottawa, Bank of Canada 
Friedman M. (1956) The quantity theory of money, a restatement, in M. Friedman (ed.) Studies 
in the Quantity theory of Money, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
--------------- (1968) The role of monetary policy, American Economic Review 58, 1-17  
--------------- (1970) The counter revolution in monetary theory London, IEA 
---------------  (1984) lessons from the 1979-82 monetary policy experience American Economic 
Review 74 327-51 
--------------- and A. J. Schwartz A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960,  Princeton, 
N.J. Princeton University Press for the NBER 
Goodhart, C. A. E. (2010) The political economy of inflation targets: New Zealand and the UK, 
in R. Leeson (ed) Canadian Policy Debates and Case Studies in honour of David Laidler, 




Hahn, F. H. (1965) On some problems of proving the existence of equilibrium in a monetary 
economy, in F. H. Hahn and F.Brechling (eds.) The Theory of Interest Rates, London, Macmillan 
for the International Economics Association 
Hoover, K. (1985) Economic theory and causal inference Working Paper 257, U.C. Davis 
Howitt, P. W. (1990) The Keynesian Recovery Hemel Hempstead, Philip Allan 
Hume, D. (1752) Of money, in Essays Moral, Political and Literary, London 
Jones, R. A. (1976) The origin and development of a means of exchange Journal of Political 
Economy 84, pt. 1, 756-765 
Karni, E. (1980) A note on Lucas’ equilibrium model of the business cycle, Journal of Political 
Economy 88 1231-1241 
Keynes, J. M. (1930) A Treatise on Money, London, Macmillan 
---------------  (1931) An economic analysis of employment in Q. Wright (ed.) Unemployment as 
a World Problem, Lectures on the Harris Foundation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press  
---------------- (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money London, 
Macmillan 
King R., and C. Plosser (1983) Money, credit and prices in a real business cycle American 
Economic Review 74, 93-115 
Kiyotaki, N. and R. Wright (1989) On money as a medium of exchange, Journal of Political 
Economy 97, 927-954 
Kydland, F. and E. Prescott (1982) Time to build and aggregate fluctuations Econometrica 50 
1345-1370 
Laidler, D, (1973) The influence of money on real income and inflation: a simple model with 
empirical tests for the United States, 1953-74 Manchester School 41 
------------- (1974) Information, money and the macroeconomics of inflation Swedish Journal of 
Economics  76, 26-42  
-----------  (1976) Expectations and the Phillips trade off: a commentary  Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy Dec.23 (1) 55-72 




----------- (2003) Monetary policy without money – Hamlet without the ghost, in Bank of 
Canada, Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, A Festschrift in Honour of 
Charles Freedman,  Ottawa, Bank of Canada. 
----------- (2020) Interactions among economic ideas, policies and experience: the establishment 
of inflation targeting in Canada 1991-2001, Review of Economic Analysis 11 
----------- and M. Parkin (1975 Inflation – a survey Economic Journal 75 741-809 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1968) On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 
Lipsey, R. G. (1960) The relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money 
wages in the United Kingdom 1862-1957 Economica NS 1-31 
Lothian J,,  M. Darby and M. Tindall (1990) Buffer stock models of the demand for money and 
the conduct of monetary policy, Journal of Policy Modeling  12 325-346 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1972) Expectations and the neutrality of money Journal of Economic Theory, 4, 
115-138 
------------------- (1973) Some international evidence of output-inflation trade-offs, American 
Economic Review 63, 326-34 
-------------------- (1975) An equilibrium model of the business cycle, Journal of Political 
Economy 83, 1113-44 
--------------------- (1976) Econometric policy evaluation Carnegie Rochester Conference Series 
1, North Holland 
--------------------- (1984) Money in a theory of finance, Carnegie Rochester Conference Series 
21 
--------------------- (1988)  Money demand in the United States, a quantitative review, Carnegie 
Rochester Conference Series 29 
---------------------- (1995) Monetary Neutrality – Nobel Prize lecture 
--------------------  (2000) Inflation and Welfare. Econometrica 68  247-274 
--------------------- (2004) Keynote address to the 2003 HOPE conference: My Keynesian 
Education, History of Political Economy 36 (supplement) 12-24  
------------------ and J. P. Nicolini (2015) On the stability of money demand Journal of Monetary 




----------------- and L. Rapping (1969) Real wages, employment and inflation, Journal of 
Political Economy 77, 721-754 
----------------  and T. J. Sargent (1978) After Keynesian economics in After the Phillips Curve: 
the Persistence of High Inflation and High Unemployment, FRB Boston 
Marcet, A, and T. J. Sargent (1992) in A. Vercelli and N. Dimitri (eds) Macroeconomics, a 
Survey of Research Strategies, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Meltzer, A. H. (2009) Inflation nation New York Times May 4th 
Patinkin D (1956) Money, Interest and Prices, New York, Row-Peterson 
Phelps,  E. S. (1967) Phillips curves, expectations of inflation and optimal unemployment over 
time, Economica NS 34 254-281 
---------------  and J. Taylor (1977) Stabilizing powers of monetary policy under rational 
expectations, Journal of Political Economy 85 163-190 
 Phillips A. W. (1956) The relation between unemployment and the rate of change of money 
wages in the United Kingdom Economica NS 25, 283-299 
Ricardo D (1821) Principles of Political Economy, 3rd ed. London 
Sargent, T. J. (1996) Expectations and the non-neutrality of Lucas Journal of Monetary 
Economics 37, 535-548 
--------------- and N. Wallace (1975) “Rational expectations,” the optimal monetary instrument 
and the optimal money supply rule, Journal of Political Economy 83 241-254 
Sraffa P. (1960) The Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
Tobin, J (1981) The monetarist counter-revolution today, Economic Journal 91, 29-42 
Wallace, N. (1990) Discussant’s Comment [on Lothian, Darby and Tindall 1990] Journal of 
Policy Modeling 12, 347 
Woodford M. (2003) Interest and Prices Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press  
